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NOTES AND COMMENTS
under the statute after the expiration of three years from the birth of the
child. In 1939 the statute of limitations was amended to its present
form.23 The effect of the 1939 amendment on the former statute of
limitations was first considered in State v. Killian, where the court said:
"This section (the former statute of limitations) however was definitely
changed by Section 3 of Chapter 217 Public Laws 1939 (the present
statute of limitations) which limited the application thereof to proceed-
ings to establish the paternity of such child." 24 Considering this state-
ment, it is difficult to understand why the court has held that "the only
material change wrought by the particular amendatory proviso was to
extend the time within which prosecutions may be brought when the
reputed father has acknowledged his child by payments...." 25 There-
fore, today the law in North Carolina requires that prosecutions be com-
menced within three years of birth or they are barred by the statute of
limitations, unless the proviso is made operative because of payments in
acknowledgment, in which case the maximum limit for commencing
the action would be six years from birth.
A father's initial gift to an illegitimate child is universal condemna-
tion. This irreparable disservice should not be further perpetuated by
allowing the father to escape the financial responsibility of his wrongful
act because of ambiguity in our law. Nor could the legislature have
intended such a result. The legislature has expressly distinguished
proceedings and prosecutions, but, if there be any uncertainty, society
and common decency dictate that it should be construed in favor of the
unfortunate child.
THOMAS A. WADDEN, JR.
Federal Jurisdiction-joinder of Non-Federal Claim
with Federal Question
Plaintiff brought an action against FBI agents to recover damages
allegedly resulting from an unlawful search and seizure of the plaintiff's
property and from a deprivation of his liberty and property without
due process of law in violation of his immunities guaranteed by the
Fourth and Fifth Amendments of the United States Constitution. The
district court dismissed for lack of jurisdiction on the ground that the
complaint failed to state a federal claim for which relief could be
granted, and the Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed.- The Supreme
Court reversed 2 on the grounds that the plaintiff had clearly and in
N' . C. GEN. STAT. (1943) §49-4.
"State v. Killian, 217 N. C. 339, 341, 7 S. E. 2d 702, 703 (1940).
2'224 N. C. 57, 29 S. E. 2d 462 (1944) ; see State v. Killian, 217 N. C. 339,.
341, 7 S. E. 2d 702, 703 (1940).
Bell v. Hood, 150 F. 2d 96 (C. C. A. 9th 1945).
'Bell v. Hood, 327 U. S. 678 (1946). Mr. Chief Justice Stone and Mr. Justice
Burton dissented on the ground that "The district court is without jurisdiction as
1948]
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
good faith founded his claim on provisions of the Constitution, and
that the claim was substantial and not frivolous so that the district court
should have taken jurisdiction before determining whether or not relief
could be granted. The district court then took jurisdiction and held:
1., that no provision of the Constitution or laws of the United States
gave a right of action in any person against a federal officer who violates
that person's immunities under the Fourth and Fifth Amendments, and
2., that the federal court was without jurisdiction to consider any non-
federal cause of action for trespass and false imprisonment arising out
of the facts alleged, since a federal cause of action was entirely wanting.3
The present note is concerned only with the second part of the district
court's holding.
The problem might be stated: to what extent and under what cir-
cumstances may issues, which are non-federal in character, be joined
in a suit before a federal court in cases where jurisdiction depends not
on the nature and relation of the parties4 but on the subject of the action,
Prior to 1933 a variety of approaches to the subject had been taken by
the courts resulting in the inevitable conflict in the cases., Beginning
with Marshall's statement in Osborn v. Bank of the United States( the
general rule was developed that all issues actually raised in a case were
within the judicial power of the district court once jurisdiction had
been acquired over the case by virtue of the substantial federal question
involved, even if the federal question was decided adversely to the
party presenting it, or even if it was not decided at all.7 This rule,
however, had found expression most frequently in proceedings to enjoin
state action on the ground that it would be a violation both of the
Federal Constitution and of the State Constitution or laws,8 and in the
a federal court unless the complaint states a cause of action arising under the
Constitution or laws of the United States," at p.' 685, and since neither the federal
law nor the Constitution affords a remedy in this case, no cause of action is stated.
The Justices further observed that the only effect of the majority holding is to
require the district court to pass upon the local question of trespass, citing Hum
v. Oursler, 289 U. S. 238 (1933).
'Bell v. Hood, 71 F. Supp. 813 (S. D. Cal. 1947).
'The new Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 28 U. S. C. A. following §723(c),
Rule 18(a) provides that a party ". . . may join either as independent or as alter-
nate claims as many claims either legal or equitable or both as he may have against
an opposing party," if joinder of parties and other rules are satisfied, so that where
there is diversity of citizenship almost unlimited joinder of claims is permitted.
See 2 MooRE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE 2118-2123 (1938).
'Note, 40 HARv. L. RFv. 298 (1926).
99 Wheat. 738, 823 (U. S. 1824) ". . . when a question to which the judicial
power of the Union is extended by the Constitution forms an ingredient of the
original cause, it is in the power of Congress to give the Circuit Courts jurisdic-
tion of that cause, although other questions of fact or of law may be involved
in it."
Sterling v. Constantin, 287 U. S. 378, 393 (1923); Lincoln Gas & Electric
Light Co. v. City of Lincoln, 250 U. S. 256, 264 (1919); Siler v. Louisville &
Nashville R. R., 213 U. S. 175, 191 (1909).
8 Chicago G. W. Ry. v. Kendall, 266 U. S. 94 (1924); Davis v. Wallace, 257
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main had been disregarded in the great mass of cases where a claim for
unfair competition was sought to be joined in a suit for patent, trade-
mark or copyright infringement. 9 In 1933 the United States Supreme
Court, in the case of Hum v. Oursler,10 endeavored to resolve the con-
flict, holding that a common law claim for unfair competition should,
have been passed on by the district court on its merits when joined with
a claim for copyright infringement over which the court had assumed
jurisdiction, even though it found there had been no infringement. But
in "attempting to formulate some rule on the subject""' the court is
said to have prescribed two conditions, viz., that the claims must rest
on "substantially identical" facts,' 2 and that the non-federal claim must
not be actually a separate and distinct cause of actiorr simply joined in
the complaint with a federal cause.' 3 Courts not in sympathy with this
decision have availed themselves of these limitations (that they find
in it) to dismiss non-federal claims which would appear to fall well
within the intent or purpose, and some even within the explicit wording,
of the rule allowing jurisdiction. Thus, the simplest device for avoid-
ing the Hum case has been to find that some additional, even if closely
related, fact must be presented to make out the non-federal claim.14
U. S. 478 (1922) ; Greene v. Louisville & Interurban R. R., 244 U. S. 499 (1917) ;
Louisville & Nashville R. R. v. Greene, 244 U. S. 522 (1917); Ohio Tax Cases,
232 U. S. 576 (1914) ; and cases cited note 7 supra.
'The'cases seem to have relied principally on language in Stark Bros. Co. v.
Stark, 255 U. S. 50 (1921); Leschen & Sons Rope Co. v. Broderick, 201 U. S.
166 (1906) and Elgin Nat'l Watch Case Co. v. Illinois Watch Case Co., 179 U. S.
665 (1901). See Geneva Furniture Co. v. Karpen & Bros., 238 U. S. 254 (1915) ;
Standard Paint Co. v. Trinidad Asphalt Co., 220 U. S. 446 (1911). For cita-
tions to lower court holdings see Schulman and Jaegerman, Some Jurisdictional
Limitations on, Federal Procedure, 45 YALE L. 1. 393, 406 (1936) and Note, 52
YALE L. J. 922, 923 (1943) ; indicating the various approaches, Note, 1 U. or CHI.
L. Rav. 480, 482 (1934).
10289 U. S. 238 (1933). Three claims were joined in the complaint, (1) for
infringement of the copyrighted play, (2) for unfair competition with regard to
the copyrighted play, and (3) for unfair competition with regard to an uncopy-
righted version of the same play. The third was dismissed for lack of jurisdiction.22Id. at 241.
12 Id. at 246 "Indeed, the claims of infringement and unfair competition so pre-
cisely rest on identical facts as to be little more than the equivalent of different
epithets to characterize the same group of circumstances." Read in its context,
this statement appears rather to emphasize the fact that in the case only one right
was alleged because the two claims rested upon identical facts.
" Id. at 245-6 "But the rule [of the cases cited supra note 7 allowing jurisdic-
tion] does not go so far as to permit a federal court to assume jurisdiction of a
separate and distinct nonfederal cause of action because it is joined in the same
complaint with a federal cause of action." Accordingly, the court dismissed a third
claim for lack of jurisdiction. See note 10 supra.
" Derman v. Stor-Aid, Inc., 141 F. 2d 580 (C. C. A. 2d 1944) ; Zalkind v.
Scheinman, 139 F. 2d 895 (C. C. A. 2d 1943) cert. denied, 322 U. S. 738 (1944) ;
Musher Foundation, Inc. v. Alba Trading Co., Inc., 127 F. 2d 9 (C. C. A. 2d
1942) cert. denied 317 U. S. 641 (1942) ; Foster D. Snell, Inc. v. Potters, 88 F.
2d 611 (C. C. A. 2d 1937). In the last cited case the court not only relies on the
contention that the facts are different, but the non-federal claim "relates to a
different period of time.. . Stark Bros. Co. v. Stark, 225 U. S. 50, 41 S. Ct 221,
65 L. ed. 496, is a flat authority that an action for damages resulting from unfair
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
But not less common is the more technical and complex method, that
of finding that the facts alleged in reality present two causes of action.15
In Bell v. Hood,16 the court seems not to have pursued either of
these courses in a clear-cut manner. It does state that the Hum case
is not applicable when the facts relied on to establish the federal claim
are not substantially identical with those setting forth the non-federal
claim17 citing four second circuit cases18 and one district court deci-
sion,19 but does not discuss whether or not that defect appears in the
case before it. Indeed, it is difficult to see how it could.2 0 Rather the
competition prior to registration of the plaintiff's trade-rhark is not within the
federal jurisdiction. We do not read the opinion in Humr v. Oursler as over-
ruling that decision and we think it controls the case at bar." The same court
had previously supposed that the Hurn case had over-ruled the Stark case, "at
least in [its]ratio decindendi.' L. E. Waterman Co. v. Gordon, 72 F. 2d 27Z
274 (C. C. A. 2d 1934). See Judge Clark's statement in Treasure Imports, Inc.
v. Henry Amder & Sons, Inc., 127 F. 2d 3, 5 (C. C. A. 2d 1942), and Zalkind v.
Scheinman, supra, at 901 n. 14. Whether or not the Stark case was overruled,
some courts continue to exclude from consideration of unfair competition claim,
any act done prior to the alleged patent, copyright or trade-mark. Treasure
Imports, Inc. v. Henry Amdur & Sons, Inc. supra opinion of Hand and Swan, JJ.
at page 6; Hydraulic Press Mfg. Co. v. Columbus Malleable Iron Co., 35 F. Supp.
603 (S. D. Ohio 1940) ; Slaymaker Lock Co. v. Reese, 24 F. Supp. 69 (E. D. Pa.
1938); Mitchell & Webber, Inc. v. Williams-Bridge Mills, Inc., 14 F. Supp. 954
(S. D. N. Y. 1936). For a criticism of this rule see Note, 52 YALE L. J. 922
(1943).
'
2 Crabb v. Welden Bros., 164 F. 2d 797 (C. C. A. 8th 1947) ; Newport Indus-
tries, Inc. v. Crosby Naval Stores, Inc., 139 F. 2d 611 (C C. A. 5th 1944);
American Broadcasting Co. v. Wahl Co., 121 F. 2d 412 (C. C. A. 2d 1941) ; Lewis
v. Vendome Bags, Inc., 108 F. 2d 16 (C. C. A. 2d 1939) ; Foster D. Snell, Inc. v.
Potters, 88 F. 2d 611 (C. C. A. 2d 1937); Fred Benioff Co. v. Benioff, 55 F. Supp.
393 (N. D. Cal. 1944). Danials v. Barfield, 71 F. Supp. 884 (E. D. Pa. 1947)
action brought (1) to gain reemployment under provision of Selective Service
Act and (2) to recover back pay on claim that employment had been at less than
union wage scale. The objection that the causes are separate seems better applied
here, and also in California Water Service Co. v. City of Redding, 304 U. S. 252
(1938) and General Motors Corp. v. Rubsam Corp., 65 F. 2d 217 (C. C. A. 6th
1933) cert. denied 290 U. S. 688 (1933).
" 71 F. Supp. 813, 820 (S. D. Cal. 1947).
17 Id. at 820.
"Dermon v. Stor-Aid, Inc., 141 F. 2d 580 (C. C. A. 2d 1944); Zalkind v.
Scheinman, 139 F. 2d 895 (C. C. A. 2d 1943) ; Musher Foundation, Inc. v. Alba
Trading Co.. 127 F. 2d 9 (C. C. A. 2d 1942); American Broadcasting Co. v.
Wahl Co., 121 F. 2d 412 (C. C. A. 2d 1941). Professor Moore observes that the
"second circuit rule," to which express reference was made in Hum v. Oursler,
fn. at p. 241, was in that case "repudiated by the Supreme Court. Naturally, the
second circuit cannot verbally cling to its former rule; but as a practical matter
it does in many cases just about what it did before, although it now achieves the
result by refusing jurisdiction over the claim of unfair competition by calling it a
separate and distinct cause of action." I MOORe's FEDERAL PRACrIcE (1947 Cum.
Supp.) §2.04, p. 94.9 Fred Benioff Co. v. Benioff, 55 F. Supp. 393, 397 (D. C. Cal. 1944). In
what respect the facts differed does not clearly appear, rather, the court seems to
have looked to the merits.
20 CALiF. CoNsT. Art. I, §19 is identical to the Fourth Amendment of the
Federal Constitution. If anything, more facts would be required to make out a
violation of the latter, among them, evidence that the defendants were federal offi-
cers acting by color of their office. The complaint, set out in the margin of Bell
v. Hood, 327 U. S. 678, 679 (1946), would seem to allege facts more than suffi-
cient to state a cause of action for trespass and false imprisonment.
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judge states that if the two causes of action2 l rest on substantially
identical facts jurisdiction should be taken of the entire case, but that
"in any event, the federal court cannot acquire jurisdiction over the non-
federal cause of -action unless the complaint also alleges a federal cause
of action."'22
First, it is at least doubtful whether the complaint here alleges two
causes of action, or only one, based on two theories of recovery or
predicated on two provisions guaranteeing a single right.23 This, of
course, depends upon the meaning given to a "cause of action." True
the Court in Hum v. Oursler, while recognizing that "cause of action"
may mean one thing for one purpose and something else for another,
indicated24 that for the purpose of determining the bounds between
state and federal jurisdiction courts should stay within the meaning
given in Baltimore S. S. Co. v. Phillips, "the number and variety of
the facts alleged do not establish more than one cause of action so
long as their result. . . . is the violation of but one right by a single
legal wrong."2 5 Even so, can it be said that a person has one right to
the protection of a copyrighted play and two rights to the protection of
his person and papers so that ,an encroachment upon the former gives
him but one cause of action while a violation of the latter gives two? *
However this may be, the requirement that a federal cause of action
must be alleged before the federal court may take jurisdiction over a
non-federal issue arising from the same set of facts seems to be without
authority in the cases.26 The only time failure of the federal claim is
21"Cause of action,' or "ground"? In the rule laid out in the Hurn case, at
246, which runs to the crux of- this problem, great care was taken to distinguish
between cases where two grounds support a single cause of action and those where
two separate causes of action are alleged. (Words italicized by the court). It
would seem for the sake of clarity, in reiterating the rule, the same care should
be taken in the use of these terms.
Bll v. Hood, 71 F. Supp. 813, 820 (S. D. Cal. 1947).
23 See Clark concurring in Collins v. Metro-Goldwyn Pictures Corp., 106 F.
2d 83 (C. C. A. 2d 1939); R.C.A. Manufacturing Co. v. Columbia Recording
Corp., 36 F. Supp. 247 (S. D. N. Y. 1940) ; Clark, The Code Cause of Action,
33 YALE L. J. 817 (1924).
24289 U. S. 238, 246 (1933).
= 274 U. S. 316, 321- (1927). 1 MooR 's FEDERAL PRAcricE §2.04 n. 46 (1938)
it is true that the Hum case uses language reminiscent of Pomeroy's defi-
nition of a cause of action as one primary right plus a delict or breach thereof,
but its decision must be based on a more pragmatic notion, for the jurisdiction
which was sustained embraced two rights-a statutory and a common law right,
and alleged violations of both."2
'L. E. Waterman Co. v. Gordon, 72 F. 2d 272, 274 (C. C. A. 2d 1934) ...
it is only necessary that we should hold that the cause of suit upon the [federal
ground] was substantial enough to support the jurisdiction of the district court."
Southern Pacific Co. v. Van Hoosear, 72 F. 2d 903, 912 (C. C. A. 9th 1934) "And
as the federal question here presented was a substantial one (and unlike cases of
diversity of citizenship, this suffices) [sic] there was no jurisdictional obstacle on
this score to a judgment for the intrastate rate." Hum v. Oursler, 289 U. S. 238,
246 (1933) ". . . where the federal question averred it not plainly wanting in sub-
stance, the federal court.. ." may disp e of the case on the non-federal ground.
Field Packing Co. v. Glenn, 5 F. Supp. 4 5 (W. D. Ky. 1933), modified as to an-
other matter and aff'd 290 U. S. 177 (193. -.
19481
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fatal to jurisdiction of the non-federal matter is where the former is
plainly "unsubstantial," made fraudulently for the purpose of gaining
access to federal courts, or made colorable.21 But, in this case the
Supreme Court had already declared that the contention that the con-
stitutional provisions give no cause of action when violated "does not
show that [plaintiff's] cause is unsubstantial or frivolous, and the com-
plaint does in fact raise serious questions both of law and fact . . ."
and "That question [whether violations of the Amendments give rise
to a cause] has never been specifically decided by this court."2 8
It would seem then that the request to have the issues of trespass and
false imprisonment determined should not have been denied for the
reasons given by the district judge. Had he found that the two issues
were not based on substantially identical facts, or that they were two
separate and distinct causes of action, without much question the result
would be within the rule of the Hurn decision, though in this writer's
opinion, either would have been a finding not warranted by the facts
of the case.2 9
The decision may be explained by the fact that the situation is an
unusual one, and to this we get a clue in the judge's statement that "the
[Hurn] decision seems to have been prompted by those considerations
which find expression in the familiar maxim-'Equity delights to do
justice and not by halves' . . . [and] a review of the decisions discloses
that in practice, almost without exception, the rule of Hum v. Oursler
has been applied only to equity cases." 30  While it is true that suits to
enjoin infringement of protected articles have been the primary cause
for invoking the doctrine, neither the Supreme Court nor the lower
courts have intimated that the rule is in any way confined to such cases,
and no reason has been advanced indicating that it should be.3 '
However, the judge in the instant case is not without support from
others of the bench3 2 in his apparent desire to limit the practice of
liberal joinder in this respect, and the topic of whether the doctrine of
the Hurn case is wise from the standpoints of constitutional theory, of
political expediency, and of trial convenience, is a lively one among
27 See Bell v. Hood, 327 U. S. 678, 682 (1946) ; Siler v. Louisville & Nashville
R. R., 213 U. S. 175, 191 (1909). Rudolf Lesch Fine Arts, Inc. v. Metal, 51 F.
Supp. 69 (S. D. N. Y. 1943). It may be unsubstantial because a recent decision
has made it wholly without merit. California Water Service Co. v. City of Red-
ding, 304 U. S. 252 (1938).
2 Bell v. Hood, 327 U. S. 678, 685 (1946).
-9 See notes 20 and 23 supra.
Bell v. Hood, 71 F. Supp. 813, 820 (S. D. Cal. 1947).
An example of a sound application of the rule in a law action can be found
in Southern Pacific Co. v. Van Hoosear, 72 F. 2d 903 (C. C. A. 9th 1934).
" See courts cited notes 14 and 15 supra. But see 60 HARv. L. REV. 424, 430
(1947) indicating Congressional proposal, H. R. 7124 §1338(b), to adopt Hum
rule in Federal Judicial Code with regard to actions on patents, copyrights and
trade-marks.
[Vol. 26
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writers and judges particularly interested in federal jurisdiction and
procedure.3 3 The argument is made on the one hand that jurisdiction,
where it might conflict with state or local interests should be carefully
confined to limitations clearly established by the Constitution and the
Congress, since our federal system at best is one of peculiar political
sensitivity.3 4 On the other hand it would seem a waste of time and
expense both for the judiciary and the litigants serving no real purpose
-to require that substantially the same facts presented in an action before
a federal court should be retried in a state court when one action should
suffice.35  It has been suggested that Hurn v.- Oursler was carefully
,calculated to strike a compromise between these two opposing considera-
tions,3 6 and indeed, in the very limitations noted above, this seems ap-
parent. The joinder rule of the Siler case is adopted as one of general
application, but only where judicial economy will thereby be served
("substantially identical" facts) and only if the local matter is in reality
a part of the transaction giving rise to the federal claim. The necessity
for showing the federal claim to be substantial has always been a requi-
site to federal jurisdiction, absent diversity. As has been pointed out
elsewhere, 7 the district court is protected by these limitations from
frivolous suits, purely local litigation, and the states from intrusion by
the federal judiciary. "We may concede that problems of allotment of
jurisdiction between state and national courts are fundamentally prob-
lems of government, calling for wise and shrewd statesmanship by any
arbiter of the relations of states to nations in a federal system .-.. .
"E.g., dissenting opinions of Judge Clark in Zalkind v. Scheinman, 139 F. 2d
895, 905 (C. C. A. 2d 1943), Musher Foundation, Inc. v. Alba Trading Co., 127
F. 2d 9, 11 (C. C. A. 2d 1942), and in Lewis v. Vendome Bags, Inc. 108 F. Od
16, 18 (C. C. A. 2d 1939). 1 MooRas FEDnMAL PRACrlCE (1947 Cum. Supp.) 91
et seq.; 2 id. 25 et seq. Note, 52 YALE L. J. 922 (1943).
" See Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Johnson, 293 U. S. 335, 339 (1934). For cases
illustrating the reluctance of the courts to decide local issues before determination
'by the state courts, see I MooiE's FEDERAL PRACriCE (1947 Cun. Supp.) 180-184.
See generally, Frankfurter, Distribution of Judicial Power Between United States
and State Courts, 13 CoRN. L. Q. 499 (1928).
"To this end the Hum rule has been applied by the second circuit in at least
six instances (cited in Zalkind v. Scheinman, 139 F. 2d 895, 901 n. 7 (C. C. A. 2d
1943)) and in several other circuits, General Shoe Corp. v. Rosen, 111 F. 2d 95
(C. C. A. 4th 1940) ; E. Edelman & Co. v. Triple-A Specialty Co., 88 F. 2d 852
(C. C. A. 7th 1937) ; Illinois Watch Case Co. v. Hingeco Mfg. Co., 81 F. 2d 41
(C. C. A. 1st 1936); Hemmeter Cigar Co. v. Congress Cigar Co. 118 F. 2d 64
(C. C. A. 6th 1941). It might be said that no time is saved in considering evidence
on a non-federal cause where as in the case under comment the federal cause is
dismissed at the outset. But, non-federal claims have been retained after patent
or copyright held invalid; United Lens Corp. v. Duray Lamp Co. 93 F. 2d 969
(C. C. A. 7th 1937) ; Bulova Watch Co. v. Stolzberg, 69 F. Supp. 543 (D. Mass.
1947) ; and even where the federal claim was not considered, Glenn v. Field Pack-
ing Co., 290 U. S. 177 (1933) ; Best & Co. v. Miller, 67 F. Supp. 809 (S. D. N. Y.
1946).
" Shulman and Jaergerman, Some Jurisdictional Limitations on Federal Pro-
cedure, 45 YALE L. J. 393. 400 (1936).T Note, 52 YALE L. J. 922 (1943).
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Even so, there will be no loss to statecraft if in the daily activities of
courts the needs of practical judicial administration may have some
sway to persuade against compelling two lawsuits where one will more
completely serve the interests of the litigants."88
ERNEST W. MACHEN, JR.
Mortgages-Foreclosures-Partial Sale of Land
A executed a deed of trust on four tracts of land to T to secure the
payment of a series of notes payable to C and maturing in 1925. In
1926, T advertised under the power of sale of the deed and sold one of
the tracts of land included therein. In 1928, T advertised and sold two
additional tracts of land. The latter tracts were bought in by C, who
went into possession, but no deed was given him for the land until 1943,
some 18 years after the maturity of the debt. Under the law then
existing, unless a mortgagee was in possession, the foreclosure sale and
the execution and delivery of the deed pursuant thereto, in order to be
valid, must have been completed within 10 years from the date the debt
matured. In a suit by the heirs of A against the heirs of C to quiet
title to the land, the issue became one of whether or not C was a mort-
gagee in possession of the two tracts to which he had no deed. Held:
For the heirs of A. It is a general rule that there can be only one f ore-
closure of a mortgage or deed of trust. When a mortgagee or a trustee
under a deed of trust elects to sell only a portion of the pledged property
to satisfy the debt, the remainder of the security is released, and he can-
not thereafter assert any right to it. Therefore, C was not and could not
have been a mortgagee in possession after the execution and delivery of
the deed made pursuant to the foreclosure sale held in 1926.1
The rule against successive foreclosures of the mortgage security has
been widely applied where a decree is sought in a court of equity, 2 on
the theory that a mortgage represents but a single security and therefore
but a single cause of action, which cannot be split. Therefore, the fore-
closure cannot be piecemeal. The basic idea of not splitting the mort-
gagee's cause of action has, in several states, been enacted into statutes
which set out that "there shall be but one single action for the enforce-
"' Judge Clark, dissenting in Lewis v. Vendome Bags, Inc., 108 F. 2d 16, 20(C. C. A. 2d 1939).
1 Layden v. Layden, 228 N. C. 5, 44 S. E. 2d 340 (1947).2 Dumont v. Taylor, 67 Kan. 727, 74 Pac. 234 (1903) (mortagee got one decree
and order of sale, but withdrew it; second foreclosure refused) ; Hanson v. Dunton
35 Minn. 189, 28 N. W. 221 (1886) (mortagee had foreclosed once for part of
the debt, sought a second foreclosure for the remainder) ; Long v. W. P. Devereux
Co., 87 Mont. 209, 286 Pac. 406 (1930) (no second foreclosure on wheat grown
on mortgaged land, where mortgagee had failed to assert his right to the wheat
in the first foreclosure by having a receiver appointed) ; Nebraska .oan and Trust
Co. v. Damon, 4 Neb. (unof.) 334, 93 N. W. 1022 (1903) (foreclosure of mortgage
for interest only, where whole debt is due, exhausts lien) ; Dooly v. Eastman, 28
Wash. 564, 68 Pac. 1039 (1902).
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